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Abstract   Law enforcement agencies rely on data collected from wire taps to construct the organizational chart 
of criminal enterprises. Recently, a number of academics have also begun to utilise social network analysis to 
describe relations among criminals and understand the internal organisation of criminal groups. However, before 
drawing conclusions about the structure or the organisation of criminal groups, it is important to understand the 
limitations that selective samples such as wire taps may have on network analysis measures. Electronic 
surveillance data can be found in different kinds of court records and the selection of the data source is likely to 
influence the amount of missing information and, consequently, the results. This article discusses the impact that 
the selection of a specific data source for the social network analysis of criminal groups may have on centrality 
measures usually adopted in organised crime research to identify key players. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades, the network perspective has become more and more influential in organised crime 
research, and social network analysis (SNA) has become popular among scholars interested in 
describing informal relations among criminals and understanding the internal organisation of criminal 
groups.1 One of the common applications of SNA in a criminological context consists in the 
representation of criminal groups and their activities, mainly in a descriptive way.2 These studies 
generally include only persons who are involved in criminal activities and are part of a specific criminal 
group; however, differences may exist in the way network boundaries are identified by the researcher. 
Another typical feature of these studies is the reliance on law enforcement data – especially, electronic 
surveillance data – as their primary source of information on the relations among criminal groups 
members. 
Electronic surveillance data have been increasingly used by scholars interested in describing the 
structure of relations within criminal groups by capturing the conversations among their members, as 
they occur every time there is the need to communicate to organise illegal activities, exchange 
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information, or arrange meetings.3 However, little attention has been paid to issues related to the 
accuracy, validity, and reliability of these data, with a notable exception, namely a recent article by 
Federico Varese and Paolo Campana addressing some of these issues and suggesting the use of a 
combination of different data analysis techniques.4 This article deals with the problem of accuracy and 
reliability of electronic surveillance data available in different court records and how the source of 
information might affect the SNA of criminal groups. Two separate issues will be addressed: group 
coverage, namely the extent to which different court documents provide an accurate description of the 
overall network, and the identification of key players. 
The next section introduces the problem of missing data in criminal network research, presents some 
of the possible causes of missing information beyond and within the final representation of criminal 
networks, and reviews and discusses the different sources of law enforcement data. After a description 
of the data and the methodology adopted for the study in Section 3, the fourth section presents the main 
results and Sections 5 and 6 discuss the limitation of this study and the main implication of the results 
for criminal network analysis, respectively. The last section concludes. 
2. Missing data issues in criminal network research 
The usefulness of SNA for the study of criminal groups has been largely discussed. Among the 
numerous benefits, this methodology allows to conduct a detailed analysis of the internal structure of 
criminal groups, capturing the informal relations among their members and avoiding any assumption 
about the organisational structure of the network prior to its actual analysis.5 
Several studies have also highlighted a number of limitations and methodological problems connected 
to these applications of SNA.6 Some of these limitations are well known by network analysts, such as 
the problem of capturing network dynamics; some others, although being shared with other fields of 
research, are magnified by the specific application of network analysis concepts and tools to covert 
networks. Among them, the problem of missing information – and thus network completeness – is 
particularly relevant in analysing criminal networks, since it affects the scope and structure of the 
network under consideration.7 Missing nodes or edges can indeed create a sort of domino effect and 
heavily affect the results, creating problems of inference also in the case of descriptive purposes. 8 
The issue of missing information beyond the final representation of the network is usually associated 
with the specification of network boundaries, which refers to the definition of rules for including specific 
                                                             
3 Natarajan, “Drug Trafficking Organization”; Natarajan, “Heroin Distribution Network”; Varese, “Criminal 
Connections”; Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks; Morselli, “Vulnerable and Strategic Positions,” 382–392; 
Calderoni, “The ’Ndrangheta Through the Lens”; and Campana, “Eavesdropping on the Mob,” 213–228. 
4 Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire,” 13–30. 
5 Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, 41; Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, “Network Analysis,” 81–82; Sparrow, 
“Application of Network Analysis,” 272; McIllwain, “Organized Crime,” 319; von Lampe, “Human Capital,” 95; 
and van der Hulst, “Introduction to Social Network Analysis,” 104. 
6 Sparrow, “Application of Network Analysis,” 262; McAndrew, “Structural Analysis,” 62; Spapens, “Macro 
Networks,” 193; von Lampe, “Human Capital,” 95; van der Hulst, “Introduction to Social  Network Analysis,” 
110; Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, 47; and Malm, Bichler, and Van De Walle, “The Ties That Bind,” 70. 
7 von Lampe, “Human Capital,” 95; van der Hulst, “Introduction to Social Network Analysis,” 110; Morselli, 
Inside Criminal Networks, 47; and Malm, Bichler, and Van De Walle, “The Ties That Bind,” 70. 
8 Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, “Network Analysis,” 70; van der Hulst, “Introduction to Social Network Analysis,” 
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actors and relations in the network under investigation.9 In organised crime research, the boundaries of 
the overall network, as identified by law enforcement agencies, do not necessarily coincide with those 
of the criminal group, and the researcher may identify internal boundaries on the basis of either 
theoretical or practical considerations.10 A possible solution might be to include actors in the final 
representation of the network on the basis of their legal position across criminal justice stages, namely, 
whether the actors have been monitored, targeted, arrested, accused, or sentenced. Depending on the 
criminal justice stage data refer to, their scope, as well as their precision, varies. Indeed, the number of 
network members decreases through the various stages within the criminal justice system, since only a 
small percentage of monitored individuals is accused and sentenced; whereas the precision of 
information increases, because actors are included in the network on the basis of judicial evidence and 
not just because of their participation in phone conversations with alleged criminals.11 
Nonetheless, the boundary specification problem cannot be completely handled by the researcher, 
since the definition of the external boundaries of the network lies where the court files end and it is thus 
dependent upon available information, rather than a precise choice of the researcher.12 Scholars usually 
rely on law enforcement data sources for the collection of information used for their analyses, but law 
enforcement agencies have a partial vision of the network under investigation, so that their data contain 
incomplete information.13 Indeed, investigators have to rely on data-gathering methods that result in 
incomplete information, such as observations, archives, informants, or witnesses. Hence, information 
from prosecutorial transcripts, interrogation material, or criminal investigation files from completed 
cases, as well as interviews with offenders or law enforcement officers, presents limitations in terms of 
data accuracy and completeness.14 
Even transcripts of wiretapped conversations include only a sample of all the conversations that 
occurred among the members of a criminal group, although the sample is not random but rather a 
purposive one, since the police usually transcribes all conversations that pertain to criminal activities in 
a broad sense, whereas conversations on personal or unrelated matters are discarded.15 
Different court documents might also be available to the researcher, and the external boundaries of 
the network, as defined by law enforcement agencies, might vary across these documents. The electronic 
communication transcripts can be found in different kinds of court records, such as wiretap records, 
police reports, arrest warrants, and sentences.16 In jurisdictions that allow to use wiretaps as evidence in 
trials, all the relevant conversations are fully transcribed in wiretap records and made available to the 
prosecutor and the judge. The arrest warrant usually includes only a selection of the electronic 
communication transcripts, as well as other relevant information on the suspects from informants and 
other investigative activities. A part of the electronic surveillance data is also usually reported in the 
                                                             
9 Marsden, “Network Data and Measurement,” 439; Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky, “Boundary Specification 
Problem,” 62; and Kossinets, “Effects of Missing Data,” 249. 
10 Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire,” 21. 
11 Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, 44. 
12 Campana and Varese, “Listening to theWire,” 20; van der Hulst, “Introduction to Social Network Analysis,” 
111; and Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, “Network Analysis,” 71. 
13 Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, 41; von Lampe, “Human Capital,” 95; Malm and Bichler, “Networks of 
Collaborating Criminals,” 20; and Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire,” 17. 
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Ties That Bind,” 55. 
15 Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire,” 20. 
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sentence, along with other sources of evidence.17 Hence, as shown in Figure 1, the closer we are to the 
judgment, the more likely we are to lose a relevant subset of electronic surveillance data. 
The purposive sample of electronic surveillance data includes all telephone conversations which were 
wiretapped by the police and considered relevant for the criminal case. Conversations on matters 
unrelated to criminal activities are not included in the sample, although some of them might have been 
misinterpreted by law enforcement agencies and included in the wiretap records as well. At the same 
time, not all criminally related conversations might have been wiretapped and reported in the court 
documents. As we move from the wiretap records to the judgment, the amount of electronic surveillance 
data included in the judicial documents decreases. It is plausible to think that information on actors who 
have been arrested and accused is maintained, whereas the information on individuals who fell into the 
surveillance net but were not brought to court is discarded. 
 
 
Figure 1. Samples of telephone conversations among criminal network members. 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Campana and Varese 2012. 
 
However, the amount of missing data might be larger, since only a sample of conversations among 
arrested and accused individuals might be included in the arrest warrant and the judgment. 
Although the conversations wiretapped by the police already constitute a sample of all the 
conversations that occurred among criminal network members during the investigation, the use of 
                                                             
17 The United States, Canada and most European countries (e.g. Italy, Germany, the Netherlands) are among 
the jurisdictions in which wiretaps can be used as evidence. In Italy, for example, wiretapped conversations 
pertinent to the investigation are fully transcribed; these include only communications  which are considered 
relevant by the public prosecutor and the defence attorneys, whereas conversations on personal or unrelated matters 
are discarded. The prosecutor’s request for pre-trial detention and the arrest warrant usually include a selection of 
the electronic communication transcripts, as well as other relevant information (e.g., from informants and other 
investigative activities). A part of the electronic surveillance data is usually reported in the sentence, along with 
other sources of evidence. 
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sources of information other than wiretap records is likely to cause a further loss of electronic 
surveillance data and might lead to misleading results. For this reason, Campana and Varese suggest to 
avoid the judgment as the main source of information for statistical analysis, because the set of 
conversations is likely to be small and biased, and the results might not be reliable.18 On the other hand, 
arrest warrants and sentences are more likely to be accessible to researchers aiming at studying criminal 
groups, and thus might constitute a useful source of data, provided they include sufficient information 
on relations among network members.19 
Along with missing nodes, missing links or edges might also constitute a problem. Considering that 
criminals involved in organised crimes often use different telephones and lines to communicate with 
different individuals or categories of individuals, and that the name of the holder does not necessarily 
correspond with the actual user, the police might not be able to wiretap all the telephones and lines used 
to deal with criminal activities. If law enforcement agencies fail to intercept a specific telephone or line, 
this might result in missing links among specific actors. Also, after the end of the investigations, there 
might be evidence that a portion of electronic surveillance data gathered by law enforcement agencies 
was collected adopting an illegal/unauthorised procedure. This might result in the discard of those data 
from court documents and, as a consequence, in missing data within the final representation of the 
network. 
Previous research in the field of network analysis mainly focused on the identification of key players 
and studied the effect of missing information on commonly used network measures, such as centrality. 20 
The work by Bolland constitutes one of the first attempts to examine the robustness of centrality under 
conditions of random and systematic errors.21 More recently, Costenbader and Valente assessed the 
stability of eleven centrality measures by randomly sampling 59 empirical networks at eight different 
sampling proportions.22 This work has been extended by Borgatti and his colleagues, who examined the 
robustness of centrality measures under conditions of incomplete or imperfect data, including node and 
edge removal.23 These studies proved that centrality measures are quite robust, especially under small 
amounts of error, and that their stability is influenced by the type of study and the characteristics of the 
network.24 In all these cases, data were randomly sampled, i.e. nodes and links were randomly extracted 
from the networks, and social network measures were estimated and compared across different samples 
of the same network. However, ‘the results could be quite different for practical settings in which the 
data collection methodology makes systematic errors (such as more readily losing nodes with low 
degree)’.25 
A recent study by Xu and Chen analysed the effect of missing links and edges in dark networks. 26 
Whereas different percentages of edges were randomly removed from the networks, confirming the 
validity of findings under small amounts of error, node removal was systematic. In order to test the 
                                                             
18 Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire,” 19. 
19 Bright, Caitlin, and Chalmers, “Illuminating Dark Networks,” 152. 
20 Bolland, “Sorting Out Centrality”, 233–253; Costenbader and Valente, “Stablity of Centrality Measures,” 
283–307; Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt, “Robustness of Centrality Measures.” 124–136; and Xu and Chen, 
“Topology of Dark Networks,” 58–65. 
21 Bolland, “Sorting Out Centrality.” 
22 Costenbader and Valente, “Stablity of Centrality Measures.” 
23 Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt, “Robustness of Centrality Measures.” 
24 Costenbader and Valente, “Stability of Centrality Measures,” 305; and Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt, 
“Robustness of Centrality Measures,” 31. 
25 Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt, “Robustness of Centrality Measures,” 132. 
26 Xu and Chen, “Topology of Dark Networks.” 
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robustness of dark networks against attacks by law enforcement agencies, node removal involved either 
hubs, characterised by a high degree of direct contacts, or bridges, i.e. nodes positioned along the 
shortest path between two other network actors.27 The finding that dark networks are more vulnerable 
to the removal of bridges rather than highly connected actors is relevant for intelligence purposes, but it 
does not provide insights into the effect that missing data due to the purposive sample of information by  
law enforcement agencies might have on SNA measures. 
All these studies focused on different measures of the centrality of actors within a network. Centrality 
measures are particularly relevant in criminal network analysis, because they allow to identify critical 
nodes, namely those actors who are particularly involved in criminal activities and whose removal would 
maximise network disruption.28 Degree and betweenness centrality are the two most common measures. 
The former estimates the number of actors every criminal network member is connected to; the latter 
measures the number of times every actor falls on the shortest path between two other members, 
allowing for the identification of those individuals who facilitate the exchange of information or 
resources in the network.29 
Assuming that a researcher aiming at analysing a criminal group might want to collect information 
about all links among all individuals that fall within the surveillance net, and then eventually, decide to 
focus only on arrested or convicted ones; this article seeks to understand the influence that the reliance 
on a specific source of electronic surveillance data might have on the missing data problem and, as a 
consequence, on the results of the SNA of criminal groups. Considering the widespread use of centrality 
measures in criminal networks research, this article focuses on the two most common measures 
described above and assesses their robustness when moving from one kind of court record to another. 
The next section describes the data and the methodology adopted in this study. 
3. Data and methods 
When assessing the relationship between the focus of criminal network research – namely, one or more 
criminal groups – and the measures used for the analysis, the general aim of the research needs to be 
considered. If the researchers aim at providing a precise description of the criminal group, then the 
accuracy of available data is a fundamental prerequisite. On the other hand, if the focus is on differences 
between individuals in terms of their position within the criminal group, or on differences across 
networks, then the robustness of network measures to measurement errors needs to be addressed. 30 In 
this second case, complete information on each criminal network member is not necessary, as far as the 
sampling still provides reliable results. 
The first part of the analysis aims at assessing whether and to what extent information on actors and 
their relations might differ across different judicial documents, and thus whether data from court 
documents other than wiretap records can guarantee the overall group coverage and provide an accurate 
description of organised crime networks. To achieve this aim, empirical data from an Italian criminal 
                                                             
27 Ibid., 64. 
28 Morselli and Petit, “Law-Enforcement Disruption,” 110; Schwartz and Rouselle, “Using Social  Network 
Analysis,” 189; and Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 159. 
29 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis; Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks,” 223–258; and 
Bonacich, “Power and Centrality,” 1170–1182. 
30 Marsden, “Network Data and Measurement.” 
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investigation, for which different court records were available, are used, and networks based upon 
information from different judicial documents are compared. 
Operation Oversize is a criminal investigation against a ’Ndrangheta group mainly operating in the 
Italian province of Lecco.31 The investigation was conducted from 2000 to 2006 by the Police Offices 
of Lecco and Milan and the Investigation Group on Organised Crime (Gruppo d’Investigazione sulla 
Criminalità Organizzata, GICO) of the Guardia di Finanza of Milan and coordinated by the Antimafia 
Prosecutor’s Office of Milan. The suspects were involved in homicides, robberies, and, above all, drug 
trafficking. The trial started in 2007 and lasted until 2009, when the judgment was passed. 32 The 
Antimafia District Directorate (Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, DDA) of Milan provided access to 
several judicial documents related to this investigation. These documents include, among others, wiretap 
records containing the transcripts of 933 wiretapped conversations, the arrest warrant, and the trial 
judgment.33 
The transcripts of intercepted communications contain the transcription of wiretappings and audio 
surveillance of monitored individuals. For each conversation, information on time (date and hour), as 
well as the full transcription, is reported. The warrant of arrest contains a selection of the transcripts, as 
well as other relevant information on both targeted and arrested individuals from informants and other 
investigative activities. Informants’ statements are given prominence and several fragments of the 
interrogations are reported. The trial judgment summarises the evidence that came to light during the 
hearings and describes the illegal activities perpetrated by each convicted individual. The trial judgment 
includes information from several sources of evidence, including wiretappings and audio surveillance. 
The three judicial documents are treated as separate sources of electronic surveillance data and used 
to create three different networks referring to the same criminal investigation. These networks are then 
analysed to assess whether and to what extent information on actors and their relations differ from one 
                                                             
31 The ’Ndrangheta is a mafia-type organization mainly operating in the Calabria region (Italy), but with 
ramifications both in other Italian regions and abroad. Its affiliates are organized in cosche or ‘ndrine, whose 
members are usually bonded by kin ties and exercise their influence over a specific  territory. A two-level 
hierarchical structure is present; low-level affiliates are referred to as members of the società minore (lower 
society), whereas bosses are part of the società maggiore (higher society). Within both the società a long series of 
different roles and tasks can be identified. The presence of a hierarchical structure, along with the presence of a 
set of formal rules, an extensive use of rituals and symbols, and strong barriers to entry, guarantees the internal 
cohesion and minimizes the risk of defections. Extortion still remains one of the main activities conducted by the 
’Ndrangheta, especially in its territory of origin. This illegal activity is particularly relevant to exercise control 
over a territory rather than to gain large profits, which are instead generated from drug trafficking. 
For further information on the ’Ndrangheta, cf. Paoli, “An Underestimated Criminal Phenomenon,” 212–238; 
Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods; Varese, “How Mafias Migrate,” 411–443; Ciconte, ’Ndrangheta; and CPA, Relazione 
Annuale Sulla ’Ndrangheta. 
32 DIA, Relazione Del Ministro dell’Interno, 105–106. 
33 Wiretap records report all wiretapped telephone conversations which were considered pertinent  to the 
investigation by the public prosecutor and the defence attorneys. From a comparative perspective, these wiretap 
records can be considered consistent with any judicial document reporting the set of wiretap conversations 
transcribed by the police and made available to the prosecutor to be used as evidence in court. 
In the Italian criminal justice system, before the actual conclusion of the investigation, the  prosecution wraps 
up the evidence and formulate the request for remanding suspects in custody or pre-trial detention. The court order 
issued by the preliminary investigation judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) upon this request is similar to 
arrest warrants in other jurisdictions. 
The Italian criminal justice system enables up to three grades of judgment by different courts. For this study, 
the first grade judgment, which is issued by a tribunal composed by a panel of three judges, has been used. From 
a comparative perspective, this court document is similar to first grade judgments in other jurisdictions (cf. 
Calderoni, “Structure of Drug Trafficking Mafias,” 325). 
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court document to another. The number of actors included in the networks and the number and 
proportion of links among them provide an insight into the overall group coverage when moving from 
data from wiretap records to those from the trial judgment, although a thorough analysis of the effects 
of the loss of information on overall network measures, such as density or cliques, is not provided and 
would require further research. However, the aim of the first part of the analysis is not limited to the 
assessment of whether a loss of information occurs. Node and edge removal might account for a different 
proportion of missing data. Also, node and edge removal might not be random, but actors or links with 
specific characteristics might be more likely to be excluded by the purposive sample after the 
investigation phase. Evidence of any pattern in nodes and edges removal is then gathered before moving 
to the second part of the analysis. 
The second part of the analysis aims at examining the robustness of some of the most commonly used 
centrality measures when data are incomplete due to purposive sampling by law enforcement agencies. 
A set of five criminal networks based on empirical data from wiretap records are used for the analysis. 
This set includes the Oversize network and four criminal groups analysed by Carlo Morselli in his 
previous work and whose network data are publicly available.34 The main requirement for the networks 
to be included in the analysis was the availability of data from wiretap records, whereas criminal groups 
whose networks are based on information from arrest warrants or judgments were excluded. However, 
some criminal networks analysed in the literature and based on information from wiretap records were 
excluded as well, since the data are not publicly available. 
 
Table 1. Networks included in the study.  
  No. nodes No. edges Max. edges Density Mean Degree 
Oversize 182 247 16471 0.015 2.714 
Caviar 110 205 5995 0.034 3.727 
Siren 44 103 946 0.109 4.682 
Togo 33 47 528 0.089 2.848 
Ciel 25 35 300 0.117 2.800 
 
Table 1 lists the networks used for the study, along with their size, density, and mean degree. 35 The 
choice of relying on empirical data, rather than generating random networks, depends on the 
acknowledgment that criminal networks generally present structural characteristics different from 
random ones, such as a power-law degree distribution where a large number of actors has only one or a  
few links and a small percentage of actors is highly connected.36 Conversely, the reliance on empirical 
data means that it was not possible to control for the original network size and density, so that their 
                                                             
34 The four networks whose data are available in Morselli’s book are: Ciel, Caviar, Siren, and Togo. The Ciel 
and Caviar networks refer to police investigations that targeted groups involved in drug importation. Projects Siren 
and Togo were instead operations against stolen vehicle exportation networks. For each case study, Morselli did 
not simply described the organizational structure of the criminal groups, but rather focused on a specific feature 
of the networks, such as partnership configurations in drug trafficking groups (Ciel network), the contribution of 
legitimate players in criminal operations and the trade-off between efficiency and security (Caviar network), or 
brokerage and criminal network flexibility (Siren and Togo networks). For more details on the criminal groups  
analysed by Morselli and their network features cf. Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks. 
35 All analyses presented were conducted using binary, undirected matrices, since valued, directed data are not 
available for all Morselli’s criminal networks. 
36 Xu and Chen, “Topology of Dark Networks.” 
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influence on measurement error could not be fully addressed. Also, the original sample of networks was 
very limited, so that the replication of this study with a larger and/or different set of networks could 
provide further insights. 
After computing centrality, the five selected networks were sampled in order to simulate the loss of 
information that was experienced by the Oversize network when moving across different court 
documents; centrality was then computed again and the results were compared to the centrality scores 
of the original network. Based on what was observed for the Oversize network, the measurement error 
introduced to construct the samples combined nodes and edge removal, so that the removal of nodes 
accounted for the 80% of missing links and the remaining 20% of missing edges concerned links  
between actors who were not affected by the node removal. Also, whereas the removal of edges was 
random, the probability for a node to be removed from the network varied according to its degree 
centrality, so that highly connected actors were less likely to be removed and peripheral nodes were 
more likely to be excluded from the sample.37 
Different proportions of error were introduced, starting with the removal of 5% of the nodes (error I), 
and then 10%, 20%, 30%, and 50% (respectively, error II, III, IV, and V). For each of the five networks, 
and for each of the proportions of error, the sampling procedure was replicated 1000 times. Degree and 
betweenness centrality were then computed, and their robustness was assessed using the five measures 
of centrality robustness proposed by Borgatti and colleagues and presented in Table 2.38 Scatterplots 
were then created to analyse the robustness of centrality measures as a function of the amount of 
measurement error added due to nodes and edges removal.39 
Table 2. Measures of centrality robustness.  
Measure Description 
Top 1 Proportion of times that the most central node in the sampled network is also the most central node in 
the empirical network. 
Top 3 Proportion of times that the most central node in the sampled network is among the top three most 
central nodes in the empirical network. 
Top 10% Proportion of times that the most central node in the sampled network is among the top ten percent in 
the empirical network. 
Overlap Number of nodes in both the top 10% of the empirical network and the top 10% of the sampled network, 
divided by the number of node in either.a 
R2 Square of the Pearson correlation between the centralities of the empirical network and the centralities 
of the sampled network, taking only nodes found in both networks. 
Note. aThe overlap between the top 10% of the empirical network and the top 10% of the sampled network is  computed as |S ∩ E | / |S ∪ E |, 
where S is the subset of nodes of the sampled network and E is the subset of nodes of the empirical one. 
Source. Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt 2006. 
4. Results 
The first part of this section focuses on the differences across the three Oversize networks in terms of 
the amount of information on actors and their relations available in different judicial documents. To 
                                                             
37 𝑝𝑖 =
𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 where 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of the node i to be included in the sample, and 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑖 is its value of 
degree centrality. 
38 Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt, “Robustness of Centrality Measures.” 
39 The analyses were performed using the sna and network packages in R (Butts, ‘sna’; Butts, Handcock, and 
Hunter, ‘network: Classes for Relational Data’). For further information on the sna and network packages, cf. 
Butts, “Social Network Analysis with sna”; Butts, “network.” 
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assess whether and to what extent the arrest warrant and the judgment can provide an accurate 
description of the criminal group, Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of the three Oversize 
networks. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the Oversize networks.  
 No. Actors % Actors No. Links % Links Density Mean Degree 
Wiretap records 182  100 247  100 0.015 2.714 
Arrest warrant 146 80.22 189 76.52 0.018 2.589 
Judgment 89 48.90 106 46.15 0.029 2.562 
 
Wiretap records report telephone conversations among 182 individuals. The total number of phone 
conversations wiretapped by the police and reported in the document are 933; however, data are here 
treated as binary, leading to 247 links between the actors, equal to the 1.5% of all possible links (density 
= 0.015). When the same network is based on the information available in the arrest warrant, the number 
of actors decreases to 146, equal to the 80% of those listed in the wiretap records. The number of links 
shows a similar trend, since it also experiences a drop of about 20% (from 247 to 189). The density of 
the network slightly increases (1.8%), probably because of the reduction in network actors. When 
moving from the arrest warrant to the judgment, the drop in actors and links is even lager. The remaining 
network members are indeed only 89, whereas the links among them are 114 (46.15% of the total 
number of observed relations). 
Both the number of actors and the number of edges strongly decrease when moving from the network 
based on data from the wiretap records to the networks based on information from the arrest warrant 
and then the judgment. However, this drop does not seem to influence the measures of cohesion of the 
network. The average degree is indeed stable across the three networks and the density remains low, 
although its value has to be carefully compared across networks of different size. 
A possible explanation of this phenomenon can be found by observing the degree distribution for the 
three Oversize networks in Figure 2. The three networks are characterised by the presence of a small 
number of actors involved in a large number of relations with other network members, and a large 
number of actors with only one or a few links. This confirms the results from previous studies, which 
found criminal networks to be characterised by the presence of a few highly connected individuals and 
a large number of peripheral actors.40 As we move from the investigation phase to the judgment, the 
number of peripheral individuals decreases, whereas the highly connected nodes are still in the network, 
although the number of links to other criminal network members has dropped. This suggests that, when 
moving to the judgment, the remaining actors are those with relatively higher degree, while most of 
those who were excluded after the investigation phase were at the periphery of the network. 
Simply looking at the visual representations of the three networks in Figure 3 provides a first 
confirmation of what observed above. Also, further evidence of the differences in terms of degree 
between actors who are present in all three networks and actors whose names appear only in the wiretap 
records or the arrest warrant is provided by the descriptive statistics reported in Table 4. 
 
                                                             
40 Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks; Natarajan, “Drug Trafficking Organization”; and Natarajan, “Heroin 
Distribution Network.” 
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Figure 2. Degree distribution of Oversize networks. 
 
 
Wiretap records Arrest warrant Judgment 
   
Figure 3. Sociograms of Oversize networks. 
 
 
Table 4. Degree and density between and within subgroups.  
 Arrest warrant Judgment 
 Yes (n=146) No (n=36) Yes (n=89) No (n=93) 
Mean degree 3.12 1.08 4.37 1.13 
Max degree 32 2 32 3 
Min degree 1 1 1 1 
Density within groups 0.020 0.002 0.037 0.001 
Density between groups 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.012 
Note. All measures were estimated on the network based on wiretap records, distinguishing between actors whose information was also 
present in the arrest warrant and the judgment and those whose conversations were discarded  after the investigation phase. 
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Actors who are present both in the wiretap records and in the arrest warrant have a mean degree three 
times bigger than those whose phone conversations are reported in the wiretap records only. The same 
consideration can be done when comparing actors whose phone conversations are reported in both the 
wiretap records and the judgment with those who are included only in the largest network; the former 
have a mean degree about four times bigger than the latter. Most individuals excluded from the smaller 
sample have indeed only one link to other members of the criminal group, and a maximum of 2 for the 
network based on the arrest warrant and 3 for the network based on data available in the judgment. 
Finally, the peripheral position of actors whose information was discarded in the later phases of the 
judicial process also emerges from the comparison of density scores within and between groups (Table 
4). In both cases, actors who are present only in the larger network have less contact among themselves 
than with those who can be found in all three networks, who have a higher density within group and 
form the core of the criminal network. 
Peripheral and poorly connected actors are thus more likely to be excluded from the network when 
moving from the investigation to the trial phase. This trend can be explained in two different and non-
mutually exclusive ways. On the one hand, actors with higher degree are probably those more involved 
in criminal activities and more active during the investigations. On the other hand, they simply might 
be those whose phones or lines were actually wiretapped, or those who were targeted by the police in 
the early stages of the criminal investigation. Being the main focus of the investigation, the police was 
able to gather more information about them, despite their actual position in the criminal group, although 
long investigations should be less affected by the goals of law enforcement agencies and the way the 
investigation was conducted, especially in its early stages.41 In both cases, law enforcement agencies 
could collect more evidence on these individuals and consequently arrest and charge them. Actors with 
one or a few contacts were instead either less involved in criminal activities or not directly wiretapped, 
and this might have led the police to clear them and to discard the conversations they were involved in 
from further court documents. 
An analysis of the outcome of the trial shows that actors who appeared to be central at the end of the 
investigation were more likely to be prosecuted and convicted, confirming results from previous 
studies.42 A significant positive correlation was indeed found between degree centrality and being 
arrested (r = .586, p < .01) and convicted (r = .256, p < .01). Similar results were obtained after 
correlating betweenness centrality with being arrested (r = .531, p < .01) and convicted (r = .305, p < 
.01). Conviction was also positively correlated with the affiliation to the ’Ndrangheta (r = .660, p < .01). 
Actors who had a formal role within the mafia group were also those with the highest centrality scores. 
They were indeed particularly involved in the organisation of illegal activities and in group management, 
whereas peripheral individuals often participated in the activities of the group only in specific situations 
or with a marginal role. Most individuals whose conversations were only reported in wiretap records 
were involved in the retail or purchase of the drug or in support of traffickers. ’Ndrangheta members, 
on the other hand, were directly involved in drug trafficking and other illegal activities, and thus needed 
to participate in more conversations with other network members. 
The exclusion of peripheral actors from the arrest warrant and the judgment leads also to the loss of 
their links. However, missing edges for reasons other than node removal might also occur. In the 
Oversize network, the exclusion of peripheral actors accounted for the 65.5% of missing edges when 
moving from the network based on the wiretap records to the network based on the arrest warrant, and 
                                                             
41 Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire,” 16. 
42 Morselli, “Vulnerable and Strategic Positions.” 
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for the 75.9% of missing edges in the network created with information from the judgment. The 
remaining missing links (34.5% and 24.1%, respectively) instead concerned the loss of information 
about actors who were still part of the criminal network when moving from the investigation to the 
judgment, but not linked to each other. 
The analysis of the differences across the three Oversize networks leads to a first partial conclusion 
that the reliance on data from court documents such as the arrest warrant and the judgment can affect 
the results when the aim of the research is a precise description of a criminal group and the relations 
among its members. Although wiretap records also report only a selection of the electronic 
communication transcripts, they can provide more accurate information of criminal networks, rather 
than the arrest warrant and the judgment, in which half of the actors and links might be missing. 
However, the researcher might seek to obtain indicators reflecting differences among actors in terms of 
network position or differences across networks in terms of structural properties, rather than a precise 
description of the criminal group. In this case, the exclusion of peripheral actors, along with the loss of 
a small percentage of other links among network members, might not have a significant impact on group 
coverage or on network analysis measures of the criminal group, such as centrality measures. 
The aim of the second part of the analysis is thus to assess the robustness of some of the most common 
centrality measures when data are incomplete due to purposive sampling by law enforcement agencies. 
The impact of random measurement error in random networks on the robustness of centrality measures 
has already been tested and the measures of centrality have proved to be quite robust under small amount 
of error.43 However, criminal networks are not randomly constructed, nor is the loss of information 
systematic. 
Table 5 presents the accuracy scores for the five criminal networks considered in this study. 
Consistently with the results of Borgatti and colleagues the two centrality measures behave similarly 
across increasing measurement error due to purposive sampling by law enforcement agencies, although 
betweenness tends to be less robust than degree in two cases (Oversize and Ciel). This is also supported 
by Figure 4, which presents robustness as a function of error level and allows to compare the different 
measures of centrality robustness across the five criminal networks. The Overlap measure is among the 
measures of centrality robustness that declines more rapidly. Only in the Ciel network, its value does 
not experience a sharp drop, probably because of the small size of the network. However, contrary to 
what happened with the random removal of nodes and edges from random networks, here the value of 
the Overlap measure is always above 0.25 and its curve usually becomes steeper after the removal of 
10% of the nodes (error II). 
But the most interesting result is probably the fact that the Top 3 and Top 10% curves show only a 
small deviation from 1, also when half of the nodes are removed from the original network. This result 
could be partially expected, considering the sampling procedure adopted, with actors with high degree 
being less likely to be removed from the network; however, this observation is consistent across all five 
networks and there are no significant differences between degree and betweenness centrality. The largest 
decrease is indeed the decrease of 0.14 when half of the nodes are sampled, experienced by betweenness 
for the Oversize network. Hence, also when 50% of nodes are missing (error V), the actor who appears 
to be central in the sampled network can be found among the top 3 actors and the top 10% actors of the 
original network almost 90% of times. 
 
                                                             
43 Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt, “Robustness of Centrality Measures.” 
  
Table 5. Results for all networks.  
 % Error - Degree  % Error - Betweenness 
Oversize NA I II III IV V Oversize NA I II III IV V 
Top 1 1.00 0.62 0.59 0.49 0.36 0.27 Top 1 1.00 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.12 0.05 
Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 3 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.86 
Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overlap 1.00 0.924 0.880 0.776 0.666 0.499 Overlap 1.00 0.917 0.874 0.772 0.664 0.496 
R-Squared 1.00 0.983 0.979 0.967 0.949 0.886 R-Squared 1.00 0.943 0.942 0.931 0.911 0.849 
Caviar NA I II III IV V Caviar NA I II III IV V 
Top 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overlap 1.00 0.826 0.788 0.715 0.629 0.453 Overlap 1.00 0.841 0.777 0.700 0.620 0.449 
R-Squared 1.00 0.991 0.989 0.984 0.976 0.952 R-Squared 1.00 0.989 0.985 0.979 0.970 0.943 
Ciel NA I II III IV V Ciel NA I II III IV V 
Top 1 1.00 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.84 Top 1 1.00 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.62 
Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 
Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 
Overlap 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.938 0.938 0.938 Overlap 1.00 0.956 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 
R-Squared 1.00 0.966 0.958 0.932 0.910 0.910 R-Squared 1.00 0.946 0.932 0.913 0.904 0.904 
Siren NA I II III IV V Siren NA I II III IV V 
Top 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 Top 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.62 
Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overlap 1.00 0.631 0.640 0.693 0.642 0.492 Overlap 1.00 0.783 0.793 0.699 0.674 0.495 
R-Squared 1.00 0.983 0.979 0.947 0.903 0.743 R-Squared 1.00 0.989 0.986 0.964 0.935 0.814 
Togo NA I II III IV V Togo NA I II III IV V 
Top 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 Top 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Top 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overlap 1.00 0.997 0.972 0.666 0.662 0.652 Overlap 1.00 0.980 0.959 0.657 0.652 0.652 
R-Squared 1.00 0.976 0.972 0.958 0.937 0.885 R-Squared 1.00 0.975 0.971 0.963 0.945 0.905 
  
 
Figure 4. Degree and betweenness accuracy as a function of error level for all networks. 
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The Top 1 measure of centrality robustness shows instead varying results across the five networks 
considered in this study. The actor with the highest degree centrality in the sampled network appears to 
be the one with the highest degree score in the original network most of times, with one exception, 
namely the results for the Oversize network. Further analyses would be necessary to support any 
conclusion, but a possible explanation might be related to the degree distribution and the presence, in 
the Oversize network, of two actors with similarly high centrality scores, so that variations in the number 
of nodes and edges might easily lead to the exchange of the first and second position in the network, in 
terms of degree. When the difference between the most central actor and the other network members is 
instead heightened, any position exchange might be less likely to occur and the Top 1 measure should 
be more robust after nodes and edges removal. 
The Top 1 measure of robustness shows a similar trend also for betweenness centrality. The Oversize 
network still presents values significantly lower than all other criminal groups, although the four 
remaining networks present more variability in terms of the robustness of the Top 1 measure than they 
do in the case of degree centrality. The robustness of the Top 1 measure for the Caviar network, for 
example, experiences a substantial drop after the removal of 5% of nodes (error I), although the accuracy 
scores do not decrease further after the first drop. 
To conclude, both centrality measures appear to be more robust in case of purposive sampling by law 
enforcement agencies than in case of random errors in random networks. Also, when half of nodes are 
missing, there is a high probability that the actor with the highest centrality score in the sampled network 
is also among the first three most central nodes in the original, overall network. The overlap between 
the top actor in both the sampled and the original network is instead less likely to occur, as the 
measurement error increases and it is likely to be influenced by the degree distribution within the 
network, along with its size and density. The next two paragraphs discuss the implications of these 
results for criminal network analysis and present the limitations of the study, whereas the last paragraph 
draws the conclusions. 
5. Limitations 
This study comes with a series of limitations that hinder the generalisation of the results. First, to create 
the networks samples it has been assumed that the loss of information from the wiretap records to the 
judgment experienced by the Oversize network is likely to occur to the same extent in other criminal 
investigations. It is not possible to know whether this is actually true, although it is plausible to expect 
a similar trend, namely the exclusion of peripheral actors rather than central ones as the investigation 
proceeds. 
Second, node and edge removal might account for a different proportion of missing data in different 
networks, although the sampling procedure adopted in this study is more realistic than random removal. 
Also, only nodes were sampled according to their degree, whereas another 20% of edges was randomly 
removed. Replicating the same study with valued and directed data might provide an insight into the 
characteristics of this 20% of links who were missing from the network for reasons other than node 
removal. We might expect, for example, that reciprocated ties are less likely to be missing. Or that links 
based only on one or a few telephone calls are more likely to be excluded than those based of a larger 
number of conversations. 
Finally, the reliance on empirical data, rather than generating random networks, did not allow to 
control for network size and density, so that their influence on the measurement error could not be fully 
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addressed. Also, the original sample of networks was very limited, mainly because of the small number 
of publicly available data on criminal networks. The replication of this study with a larger set of 
networks, as well as a different one, might provide further insights into the robustness of centrality 
measures in this particular setting. 
Despite these limitations, some conclusions on the reliability of different court records to analyse 
criminal networks and identify central actors can be drawn. 
6. Discussion 
The first aim of this study was to assess whether data from court documents other than wiretap records 
can provide an accurate description of criminal networks. The analysis of the three Oversize networks 
allowed the identification of differences among sets of relational data extracted from different court 
documents. Both the number of actors and the number of links among them decrease, and in the 
judgment, only about 50% of both actors and edges are reported. Due to this substantial drop, both the 
arrest warrants and the judgment do not seem to provide an accurate description of the network, although 
the two measures of cohesion of the network – density and mean degree – remain fairly stable across 
the three Oversize networks. However, the lesser accuracy of judgments and, to some extent, of arrest 
warrants, compared to wiretap records, may lead to an incomplete picture of the network and, 
consequently, to misleading results for the overall network measures, as suggested by Campana and 
Varese.44 
The first part of the analysis also provided evidence of the purposive sampling conducted by law 
enforcement agencies when moving from the investigation to the trial phase and discarding part of the 
electronic surveillance data. Peripheral and poorly connected actors were more likely to be excluded 
from the network after the investigation phase, either because they are less involved in criminal activities 
or they do not contribute directly to the issues targeted by the police. 
The second aim of this research was instead to assess the reliability of data found in different judicial 
documents to identify key players. The results seem to suggest that degree and betweenness centrality 
are quite robust under conditions of missing nodes and edges. These findings are consistent with those 
from previous studies, which proved the accuracy of centrality measures under small amounts of random 
measurement error.45 They also show that the two most commonly used centrality measures are even 
more robust in organised crime research, where networks are not random, and neither is the 
measurement error, since actors with low degree are more likely to be excluded from the networks based 
on information from arrest warrants and judgments. Degree and betweenness centrality have indeed 
proved to be particularly robust, also under large amounts of error. Whereas the correct identification of 
the most central actor might not always be accurate, especially when a large number of nodes and edges 
is missing, widening the scope to the first three actors is likely to provide reliable results in terms of the 
identification of the key players within the criminal group. 
On the basis of these results, some considerations on the implications that the reliance on a specific 
source of wiretap data might have on the SNA of criminal groups can be made. Despite the probability 
of missing information, arrest warrants and judgments seem to be reliable data sources to identify key 
                                                             
44 Campana and Varese, “Listening to the Wire.” 
45 Bolland, “Sorting Out Centrality”; Costenbader and Valente, “Stability of Centrality Measures”; Borgatti, 
Carley, and Krackhardt, “Robustness of Centrality Measures”; and Xu and Chen, “Topology of Dark Networks.” 
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players regardless of whether a large proportion of peripheral nodes is missing. The purposive sampling 
conducted by law enforcement agencies guarantees a low probability of relational information on key 
players to be discarded when moving from the investigation phase to the judgment. Also, contrary to 
other judicial documents, judgments are publically available and contain information other than 
conversations among network members. Provided that they include sufficient information on relations 
among the members of a criminal group, they thus may be a useful source of data for the SNA of criminal 
organisations.46 
Considering the amount of information present in the different types of court documents, wiretap 
records should probably be the first choice for researchers interested in the analysis of criminal networks. 
However, given the public availability of judgments, as opposed to wiretap records and arrest warrants, 
and the robustness of centrality measures under conditions of imperfect data, the reliance on judgments 
might further facilitate the spread of SNA methods in organised crime research. 
7. Conclusions 
This study has addressed the issue of the accuracy and reliability of different law enforcement data 
sources for the analysis of criminal networks through SNA and the identification f key players. Despite 
several limitations, the results suggest that degree and betweenness centrality are particularly robust 
when the available information constitutes a purposive sample of all wiretapped telephone conversations 
among criminal network members. This findings have both research and policy implications. 
First, they suggest that researchers aiming at applying SNA in a criminological context should be 
confident about relational data collected from different kinds of court records, including judgments, 
especially when the focus of the research is on differences between individuals in terms of their position 
within the criminal group, rather than a precise description of the group itself. This is particularly 
relevant considering that some types of judicial sources, such as judgments, are publicly available once 
the case is closed, whereas wiretap records and arrest warrants might not be accessible to the researcher.  
Second, evidence of the robustness of centrality measures under conditions of imperfect data means 
that the adoption of network analysis measures during criminal investigations may help law enforcement 
agencies to identify key players within the criminal group under investigation, in order to arrest them 
and achieve the maximum of disruption of the network. 
The positive findings with respect to the reliability of data from different court documents should 
however be supported and strengthen by further studies involving different criminal investigations in 
different jurisdictions, a larger set of criminal networks, or relational data where the information on the 
direction and amount of telephone calls is preserved. 
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